Counterfeiting and theft have always been problems that incur high costs and results in considerable losses for the international markets. In this research paper, we will address the issue of counterfeiting while using RFID technology in retailer systems or other industries by presenting a new anti-counterfeiting and anti-theft system for the retailer market. This system will address the two above mentioned issues and provide a solution that can save the retailer systems millions of dollars yearly. This proposed system will achieve the objective of preventing or minimising the counterfeiting and theft of tagged products. At the same time, it will provide a strong indication for suspiciously sold or obtained items. Furthermore, we conducted a security analysis to prove the correctness of our protocol on the basis of the strand spaces.
Introduction
Counterfeiting is one of the major problems that have affected merchandising and retailing systems worldwide for a long time. According to a Grand View research report, the counterfeiting industry has cost US manufacturers more than USD 200 billion over the past two decades [1] , [2] . Although many researchers have adopted the RFID technology instead of the barcode to address the counterfeiting problem, the problem continues to plague this industry. RFID is a reliable technology that can address many security issues, including counterfeiting and cloning. A number of researchers have proposed several methods to address these problems. Some of these methods are track-and-trace methods or PUF-based methods. However, most of the existing methods do not provide a sufficiently integrated picture to address the counterfeiting and theft problems. Here, we propose a new anti-counterfeiting and anti-theft scheme for retailer systems, which will prevent the counterfeiting of the RFID tags attached to the products. The proposed protocol will also address other security aspects such as authentication and confidentiality. The proposed scheme will establish strong authentication by using shared secrets, XOR function, and randomly generated numbers, as it needs to establish trust before exchanging the tags' information to identify these tags and determine whether the products are counterfeit or not. The communication between readers and tags is processed with wireless RF signals in an RFID tag; therefore, eavesdroppers may listen to the communication to obtain the secret. Moreover, the tag's memory can be read in the absence of access control. The proposed protocol will address this variability issue as well. RFID systems can be compromised by frequency jamming, denial-of service (DOS) attacks, or RFID Blocking, as well as exploits tag signalling anti-collision mechanisms, etc. The physical theft of goods is common in the retail business section as well as in the supply chain. In our study, we also considered an anti-theft system which will determine whether 3 of 14 a way that the genuine reader, database, or users would not know the difference between the genuine tag and the replicated one. Recently, we proposed a framework to prevent counterfeiting [3] ; this was not the first work as one of the recent novels was a system proposed by [4] and consists of a tag authentication protocol, which has four key players, namely the RFID tag, the reader, the server, and the seller, and the database correction protocol, which has two players, namely the seller and the server. The first protocol authenticates the tags without revealing their sensitive information and allows the customer to inquire whether the tag is genuine or not. While the database correction protocol guarantees the correctness of the tag status. The tag authentication protocol determines whether a product is genuine by using t − id and the random number R1. The authors also used a cryptographic one-way function F to share the secret S which is known by the legit tag. With respect to their security analysis, the authors assumed that there would be two major goals for the potential adversary: the first was to counterfeit tags by stealing the secret information of the tags, and the second was to corrupt the system functionality by attacking the server database. Both of them can be intercepted and solved by the tag authentication protocol and the database correction protocol. In contrast, in the case of RFID tag counterfeiting, the adversary must know the secret S corresponding to the tag t − id, as this S is at least 128 bits in length, which satisfies the key size requirement according to ECRYPT II NIST, which enables the adversary to brute-force a search to figure out S according to the authors [5] . Cheung [6] also proposed a two-layer RFID-based track-and-trace anti-counterfeiting system: the front-end RFID-enabled layer is for tag programming and product data acquisition, and the back-end anti-counterfeiting layer is for processing product pedigree and authentication for high-end bottled products, such as brandy and MouTai wine. The back-end layer consists of a set of system servers that enforce a track-and-trace anti-counterfeiting information server to collect the company's information from the Sc, an authentication server to verify the transaction records, a pedigree server to generate the complete pedigree for the products through the Internet and the mobile network, and a record server to store the screened records. At the same time, the products are identified by the embedded RFID tags which have a unique tag identification number (ID) that is used to form the transaction record, which will be later verified by the authentication server to detect suspicious activities while the supply chain partners verify the partial product pedigree from the pedigree server. However, the system faces a couple of implementation issues in the RFID-based track-and-trace anti-counterfeiting, such as partial tag programming, which results in a data loss as the tag moving speed might be too fast leading to an incomplete information write on the tag, as it stays for a short period of time. Another implementation issue such as a duplication error might occur when a unique number is programmed into two or more tags, which hamper the subsequent product authentication. A case study was also conducted to examine the implementation problems; it revealed that the use of a C1G2 UHF RFID reader for tag programming was possible by designing an EPC numbering scheme for the product identifier and the implementation for tag programming. Earlier, in [7] , the researchers proposed a feasible security mechanism for anti-counterfeiting and privacy protection, which featured mutual two-pass authentication and used a hash function as well as an XOR operation to enhance the RFID tag's security. Although the protocol can be described as a low-cost protocol which deals with low-cost RFID tags, the protocol requires the system to store the authorised reader IDs, which might lead to further security complications. In [8] , the authors discussed an RFID anti-counterfeiting system for liquor products on the basis of the RFID and two-dimensional barcode technologies. The basic idea was to apply the RFID technology to authenticate the verification of the liquor products and apply the two-dimensional barcode technology to verify the reader-writer identity in the system. The two-dimensional barcode is an image file, which makes it difficult for the verification system to distinguish the correct barcode from the fake or copied barcode, so the researchers attempted to combine the RFID with the two-dimensional barcode and apply them to liquor products. The authors used the cipher system of barcodes for this purpose, yet the system design itself depended partially on the barcode, which complicated the process and prevented the use of all the benefits of the RFID technology. In [9] , the authors presented an anti-counterfeiting system for agricultural production based on five phases, which can be divided Preprints (www.preprints.org) | NOT PEER-REVIEWED | Posted: 23 December 2019 doi:10.20944/preprints201912.0304.v1 into the design of readers, tags, and the data management system. These phases are the production phase, process phase, transportation phase, storage phase, and sales phase. The idea is basic; it deals with each phase independently, yet the design needs more elaboration to identify the scenarios of the anti-counterfeiting solution clearly. In [10] , the authors presented a track-and-trace system for RFID-based anti-counterfeiting for pharmaceutical drugs and wine products, as they caused huge losses in revenue to genuine companies. However, some enterprises used packaging technologies such as holograms, barcodes, security inks, chemical markers, and the radio frequency identification (RFID) systems. In [11] and [12] , the authors presented a new method to manage RFID tags in the supply chain and to prevent tags and goods from counterfeiting by using a new protocol called the Matryoshka protocol. This protocol presented a new method for managing RFID tags that would reduce the reads to a minimum to achieve better security and privacy results. Al thought this was not the first work which the authors had produce in the field of RFID tag security as they had previously researched the topic and proposed a secure method of authentication in [13], [14] , [15] and [16] . Also, in [17] , we compared the available methods according to the technique which were used to address RFID counterfeiting. We also showed results of the comparison between the available techniques used such as physical [18] , [19] or PUF [20] , Track and trace [21] , distance bounding [22] , [23] , and cryptography [4] in relation to cost, adaptability and security. Also, Some work was done in off-the-shelf passive RFID tags, [24] and [25] then in [26] , where the researchers designed a crowd monitoring approach using mobile phone for crowd detection adopt clustering methods and implemented the design on off-the-shelf smartphones. Furthermore, in [27] , the authors recently modified an ownership transfer protocol proposed by Kapoor and Piramuthu in [28] . They could detect the counterfeit and track and trace the products in the supply chain. The suggested protocol had three phases to operate, namely the product delivery phase, the product takeover phase, and the product sale phase. However, the researchers did not show exactly how the system was secure against all the security attacks although they claimed that their protocol protects against all types of security attacks.
The proposed scheme

System set-up
Before we go through the system, we will first assume that the tagged items are in a retailer store have not been compromised, as they have all been stored in a secure environment. We also assume the following:
Preprints (www.preprints.org) | NOT PEER-REVIEWED | Posted: 23 December 2019 doi:10.20944/preprints201912.0304.v1 • The product will always have two tags: one attached to the product itself, and the other attached with the warranty card. • The tag issuer is the product manufacturer who will feed the system with t − id.
• The product manufacturer will also feed the AC with the warranty card ID wt − id.
• The product service hub (PSH), which is an intermediate server connected to both the AC and the AT servers, is accessible by any reader with a correct User − Id to prevent the use of unauthorised or malicious applications. The reader is a device used by the customer or any SC entity and can be a smartphone with the authentication protocol downloaded from the PSH; only readers with this application can check and verify whether the product is genuine. • Every time the buyer or customer or seller or a distributor or any SC entity downloads the application from the PSH, the anti-theft (AT) server will issue an Application ID to the downloader. • If the application ID is not correct, the PSH will respond 'Not correct application' and terminate.
• The AC will respond with Ok to the PSH once the product is verified using the authentication method which we will discuss later. • The reader must read both tags simultaneously; otherwise, the read will be incorrect or missing.
In case of missing, the PSH will check with AT whether the reader has an existing owner ID and Application ID database, and if the tag ID is correct, it will respond with OK to the PSH. • If the AC did not respond or responds faulty to the PSH, the PSH will respond with NGP,
indicating that the product is not genuine. • If both the AC & the AT respond with OK to the PSH, the PSH will respond with OK and the AT server will issue a new owner record. • If there are no warranty card tag ID and no existing owner number, the PSH will provide the response 'invalid' and report the application ID for checking. • Every two tags for the same product will have the same 'S'.
System flow
Now, we will consider a seller/buyer use case were each RFID tag attached to the product stores a unique t − id and the corresponding secret S as well as the Q, while the reader is a device used by the customer such as a mobile phone with a genuine User ID user − id and authentication software, which is downloaded from the PSH. The wt − id is a unique tag ID for the warranty card which can be found on the labels, boxes, or warranty cards of the products; the reader must read both t − id and wt − id simultaneously in order to authenticate the product, as we will discuss later in this paper. If the products are very small and too many, such as many products sharing one box, we might also use the Matryoshka protocol. The product manufacturer is the tag issuer for both the product tags and the warranty card tags. It will feed the data of the tags to the AC server. The entities of the database are t − id, wt − id, S, and user − id as well as the product serial number Q. In contrast, the AT server will be fed by the supplier or the retailers, as they need to provide their consent to store the buyers' records and information in their database, which the manufacturer will not be able to do easily.
The system process
Anti-counterfeiting (AC) server process
The elements which will play a role in this process are t − id, user − id, wt − id, Q, the secret S, and the reader secret w or w 1 .
• Step 1: The reader will first download the software or application from the PSH site. The PSH in return will issue a user − id for the buyer including his name, his address, and maybe his apple store or android ID depending on the operating system he uses to obtain more security, particularly when using his mobile phone, which will be stored later in the AT server. The buyer 
Find N Figure 2 . The proposed Anti-Counterfeiting protocol can use this application to make an enquiry about a certain product in the retailer store, for example, by scanning a barcode or entering the product serial number Q and sending it to the PSH through the software downloaded earlier. The reader will initiate the protocol by sending Q to the reader. • Step 2: In this step, once Q is received, the PSH will generate a w or a reader secret. This will happen each time the reader has a request. Then, the PSH will store the w in the AC server. The PSH will also verify w from Table III and calculate RE from Formula 1 by generating a random number R1 and XOR-ing Q, R1, and S, and sending the results to the reader. • Step 3: The reader will forward RE to the tags attached to the product and the warranty card.
Then, the tags will solve RE, determine R1, and calculate A and B. Then, the tags will respond to the reader with A and B from Formulas 2 and 3, as shown in Fig. 2 .
•
Step four: Once A and B received by the reader, the reader will generate the random number R2 then calculate RF, Q and create C and D from formulas 4,5,6,7. Then the reader will send C,D to PSH. • Step five: in this step, the PSH will determine user − id and the secret S, if the user − id and S is correct it will continue . if not it will terminate, then it will contact AC server via a secure channel to determine the data base of the t − id as well as the wt − ID in the record with Q see the table 3 . 
The PSH will get R2 from equation 8 then will check if Q= Q ⊕ w ⊕ R2 or Q= Q ⊕ w − 1 ⊕ R2 if it's true then it will extract C and D then check if t − id = A ⊕ R1 ⊕ S and if wt − id=B ⊕ R1 ⊕ S, if true the PSH will determine N value from table II, If all the elements t − id, wt − id and S matches the record, then it will response genuine to the PSH or OK otherwise if the t − id or the secret S not correct the server will response NGP or the product is not genuine. If the tw − id is missing or 0 the PSH will replay Mt or tag missing. then calculate E and F from equation 9 and 10, then will generate a new w then will updatew ( − 1) with w and send E and F to the reader. • Step Six: in this step, the reader will check if user − id= F ⊕ R2 and if N= E ⊕ w ⊕ user − id then it will update the w.
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Anti-theft server AT process
The system can provide a feature to determine whether the product which is subject to investigation is stolen or not. The PSH and the AT server are the main players is this process once the AC server responded with 'OK'. When the buyers check if the product is genuine and want to buy it from the legal retailer or seller we will call this 'theft-check use case'. The seller will generate a NO − id for the new owner and change the existing ownership of the product by sending t − id, wt − id and NO − id to PSH which in it's turn will forward that to the AT to update. So in the AT data base the record will be saved as table three below: Now let's assume that the AT server has received a request from PSH to identify if the product is stolen or not. Usually this process will be conducted once the AC server has responded with OK. Then the AT server will request the EX − ID from the PSH which in it's turn will request it from the user, the user must submit a valid EX − ID to PSH. Once the AT server received a valid EX − ID from the PSH , it will compare it to the record if it has the same t − id and Wt − id , if that is true then the AT will respond with OK.IF the EX − id does not match with t − id and Wt − id then the AT will respond suspected item. The seller has to submit a valid EX − ID or a new owner ID in order to declare the product genuine otherwise it will be suspected item. When a selling operation occurred the genuine existing owner has to provide the seller exciting owner ID for the product in order to finalize the selling operation and this will enable the new owner to obtain a New Owner ID otherwise the selling operation won't be complete and the old owner can still claim the ownership of the product but the genuine buyer will still have the paper work to stop the old owner claims for ownership in worst case scenario if the new owner forget to obtain the Existing owner ID or he did not change the ownership of the product to the New owner ID. In other words both the new owner ID and the existing owner ID will provide a genuine ownership claim for the genuine owner who is requesting the AT server for the product, this will provide flexibility and will trace the product to the previous owner as well, which will help in case the buyer wanted to return the product or there was a warranty issue that force the buyer to return the product with no much of issue as the both owners are there in the AT system.
Security Analysis
In order to prove our protocol ACP is correct and resistance to attacks we will start analyzing it using a formal security method based on strand and strand space technique [29] , [30] , [31] , [32] . The strand is a finite sequence of transmission and receptions or a sequence of events represents executions Preprints (www.preprints.org) | NOT PEER-REVIEWED | Posted: 23 December 2019 doi:10.20944/preprints201912.0304.v1
of actions by a legitimate party or executions done by a penetrator while the strand space is a collection of strands generated by casual interactions occurred. We suppose that PSH has executed the first node of a session by sending RE to the the reader which will forward it to the tags. Does the PSH guarantees that an adversary would never be able to replicate or repeat RF from listening to previous rounds ? to answer this question we will find out if RE lacks randomness an adversary can generate or replicate RE from listening to previous rounds between the reader and the tags or between PSH and the reader which is not the case in this protocol since RE contains R1 which is a random number generated by PSH which makes RE uniquely originated and fresh. even if the penetrator was able to find the values of Q and RE it will not be able to discover the randomly generated value of R1 or compromise the secret S since our protocol require an initiator AA to generate a fresh symmetric key R1 then Xor it in the value of RE for the responder BB which is the reader in this case and the the other responders CC1 and CC2 which represent the tags [29] . The responder BB will wait for the message A and B which has to contain the secret S.
AA's point of view
The nonce test and checking the secrecy of R1 Proposition: Principle 1.1 (The Nonce Test) suppose that R1 is unique, and R1 found in some rounds in Skeleton AA at the node n 1 . Moreover suppose that, in the message of n 1 ,R1 is found outside all of a number of encrypted forms the term RE 1 then in any enrichment of BB of AA . such as BB is a possible execution, either: 1. one of the matching decryption keys S is disclosed before n 1 occurs, so that t − id could be extracted by the adversary or else: 2. Some regular strand contains a node m 1 in which R1 is transmitted outside RE, but in all previous nodes m 0 = > + m 1 , R1 was found only with this encryptions and m 1 occurs before n 1 By saying that if R1 can be obtained or extracted from the Xored forms then the adversary can do so 'Case one' or else some regular strand has done so(Case 2). Case 1 was excluded by the assumption S belongs to non. The protocol in figure 4 does not appoint any instance of the behaviour described in Case 2.
Proof: we start by exploring AA's point of view by assuming that AA was active in a session of ACP and ask if there was any other behaviour which has been occur during the session or did not occur. By exploring the behaviour activity from AA point of view, it is essential for analysing the protocol by telling us which behaviour must have occur in the system. We suppose that the initiator AA has executed the first node of a session, transmitting the secret R1 with in the message RE. Is AA guaranteed that an adversary can never obtain the value of the secret random number R1 ? the answer is no in at least two cases. 1. when the secret generator lacks randomness then an adversary may generate the key and test which one was sent. otherwise the way R1 was chosen may suggest that it is fresh and unguessable 'uniquely originating' for such a R1. which is not the case in ACP since the value of R1 was Xored with a value that contain the secret S in RE.
2. when the value of RE is compromised, the adversary can then extract the values of S , then extract R1 too. Its not important if CC is dishonest or weather CC secret S has been compromised. In both cases CC's secret has been used in a way that is not stipulated in protocol definition. All local behaviours divide into a strand of the protocol called a regular strand and an adversary behaviors. So the principle AA is regular only if its secret key used in regular strand.
The minimality principle states that in any execution if a set of transmissions EE and receptions nodes not empty in any execution then EE has earliest member. We will call the uncompromised key non-originating ' non '. Since AA 0 , there is a node in which R1 appears without encryption by the minimality principle there is no earliest point which R1 appears outside of the cryptography protection RE. If the adversary could use S, via the adversary decryption but assumption that S belongs to 'non' excludes that.If the adversary was able to re originate the same R1 by chance then the re origination would be an earliest transmission unprotected by RE. The assumption unique=R1 exclude this. Thus, any earliest transmission of R1 outside the form RElies on a regular strand of our protocol. So since R1 is unique this will make the attempting to compromise the tags by the adversary not possible since non= S and Unique =R1.
When we examine the Fig 4 we notice that the key is received by a participant only on the first node of a responder strand. while BB will forward it to CC after Xoring it in RE since the step will be executed instantly there is no risk that the adversary or the listener node between AA and CC can repeat this message to CC1 and CC2 to obtain the response A and B however if the adversary was able to do so, it would not be able to mutate the correct RF. which will lead to the discovery of the attempt and hold the operation while the discloser of the secret random number R1 will not be in danger. which means that AA 0 is a dead end or a dead skeleton.
AA's point of View
The encryption test checking the secrecy of t − id Proposition: Principle 1.2 ( the encryption test ): Suppose that t − id is found in some message received in a skeleton BB at a node n 1 . Then in any enrichment CC of BB such that CC is a possible execution, either : 1. The encryption Key S is disclosed before n1 occurs, so that the adversary could construct |t| s ; or else 2. A regular strand contains a node m1 in which t − idis transmitted, but no earlier node m 0 => + m 1 containst − id, and m1 occurs before n1. When applying principle 1.2 to construct skeletons BB1 , BB2,using the instance t= S, Case 1 furnished BB1 and Case 2 yield BB2 . The node n1 is the later (reception ) node of BB. Proof Suppose that an initiator has executed a local session of its role in the protocol. What forms are possible for for execution as a whole behaviour ?to answer this question we will assume that t 0 = A and B then we analyses the transmission. Since CC transmits A and B the first node require no explanation. The second node though BB reception of A and B require an explanation, where did A and B came from ? to make it easy we will talk only about A since the same case scenario will apply on B. 1. Possibly R1 is disclosed to the adversary that he might used it to prepare the message A? we can test this by adding a listener node to witness discloser of the encryption random number R1. 2. We may add a strand of the protocol, including a node that transmits A, this must be the second node of a responder strand. However, what values are possible for other parameters of the strand. This lead us to BB 2 since we exclude BB 1 which must be a dead end because it is an enrichment of CC 0 . The BB 2 has an unexplained node, the upper right node n D recieveing A. we will apply principle 1.1 the value R1 have been observed only in t 0 , is now received on n D in a different form. Since S belongs to 'non', case one does not apply then we must have a regular strand that receives R1 only with encrypted form t 0 and retransmits it outside of t 0 .But in analysing CC 0 we have already seen that the protocol has no strand which leads us to a single case of BB 2 that is similar to BB 1 so that any execution compatible with BB must contain at least the behaviour shown in BB 2 1
CC's point of View
The Authentication Guarantee test checking the secrecy of S Proposition: Principle 1.3 (The CC's Authentication guarantee Test) suppose that S is unique, and S found in some rounds in Skeleton AA at the node n 1 . Moreover suppose that, in the message of n 1 ,S is found outside all of a number of encrypted forms the term A 1 then in any enrichment of CC of AA . such as CC is a possible execution, either: 1. one of the matching decryption keys S is disclosed before n 1 occurs, so that S could be extracted by the adversary or else: 2. Some regular strand contains a node m 1 in which S is transmitted outside A, but in all previous nodes , S was found only with this encryptions and m 1 occurs before n 1 By saying that if S can be obtained or extracted from the Xored forms then the adversary can do so 'Case one' or else some regular strand has done so(Case 2). Case 1 was excluded by the assumption S belongs to non. Proof: we start by exploring CC's point of view by assuming that CC was active in a session of ACP and ask if there was any other behaviour which has been occur during the session or did not occur. By exploring the behaviour activity from CC point of view, it is essential for analysing the protocol by telling us which behaviour must have occur in the system. We suppose that the initiator CC has executed the first node of a session, transmitting the secret S with in the message A or B. Is CC guaranteed that an adversary can never obtain the value of the secret S ? the answer is no in at least two cases. 1. when the secret generator lacks randomness then an adversary may generate the key and test which one was sent. otherwise the way S was chosen may suggest that it is fresh and unguessable 'uniquely originating' for such a S. which is not the case in ACP since the value of S was Xored with a value that contain a random number R1 in A and B. 2. when the value of CC1 or CC2 was compromised, the adversary can then extract the values of R1 ,t − id,wt − id then extract S too.
we notice that CC will send S to BB after Xoring it in A and B since the step will be executed instantly there is no risk that the adversary or the listener node between CC and BB can repeat this message to CC to obtain the response A and B however if the adversary was able to do so it would not be able to mutate the correct A. which will lead to the discovery of the attempt and hold the operation while the discloser of the secret S will not be in danger. which means that CC 0 is a dead end or a dead skeleton.
Conclusion
Counterfeiting and theft have always been problems that incur considerable losses for the international trading markets; however, not a lot of work has been done to address these problems and deal with them. Here, we presented a new anti-counterfeiting and anti-theft system for retail markets that will address these two issues and provide a solution that can save the retailers millions of dollars per annum. In our literature review, we presented the works done so far on these issues. Moreover, we presented other works on related subjects that might cause counterfeiting to occur, such as ownership transfer and on some other technologies that might affect our research objective, particularly when Preprints (www.preprints.org) | NOT PEER-REVIEWED | Posted: 23 December 2019 doi:10.20944/preprints201912.0304.v1
using the RFID technology on a large scale, such as the IoT environment, supply chain environment, or retailer systems.
